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Appellant Keith W. Bourgeous, through his counsel of record, submits 
this Reply Brief in Support of his Appeal. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The most troubling aspect of this appeal is that Appellee, the Department 
of Commerce (f,UDCM), has refused to address on the merits the denial of 
Appellant Bourgeous' application for an engineering license since October 24, 
1997, over 14 months. Normally it is the state agency which seeks to insure 
that a matter within its jurisdiction does not advance prematurely to the courts 
until all of the agency's remedies have been explored and exhausted. Hi-
Country Homeowners Ass'n v. Public Serv. Commission, 779 P.2d 68 (Utah 
1989). 
In spite of Appellant Bourgeous' efforts to present to UDC all of the 
evidence and arguments relevant to his license denial before filing suit, UDC 
refused to address any of those merits. First, UDC claimed that Bourgeous had 
not included a copy of UDC s denial letter with his request for agency review. 
Then, when Bourgeous sent a second copy of the denial letter, UDC summarily 
rejected his request for review. Second, Bourgeous retain counsel who timely 
filed a Request for Reconsideration. The request consisted of meritorious and 
relevant information to Bourgeous application for license. That information 
included: (1) proof that Bourgeous had been awarded in 1990 an "Engineer-in-
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Training CertificateM by the Department of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing ("DOPL") which provided that he had 10 years in which to complete 
all the requirements for licensure, which he did within the 10 years; (2) proof 
that Bourgeous obtained an electrical engineering degree in 1989 and passed all 
of the National examinations required by DOPL; and (3) proof that DOPL had 
treated similarly situated persons differently than Bourgeous by awarding such 
persons a professional engineering license. Mountain Fuel Supplv Co. v. Public 
Serv. Commission, 861 P.2d 414 (Utah 1993) (before an error is considered on 
appeal to the Court, the agency should have a chance to correct it). 
Had Bourgeous filed suit after the UDC's initial denial and before his 
request for reconsideration, (as UDC argues that he should have), UDC would 
have taken the position that Bourgeous had failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies and that UDC had not been presented with all of the facts and 
circumstances relevant to Bourgeous' license application. Now, 14 months later, 
Bourgeous is still trying to have the merits of his appeal addressed by UDC. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT DOES NOT 
PROHIBIT RECONSIDERATION OF AN AGENCY REVIEW. 
Appellee UDC argues that U.C.A. § 63-46b-13 bars Agency 
Reconsideration when there has been an Agency Review or in "other words, 
Agency Reconsideration is not available where Agency Review is.11 (UDC Brief 
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at p. 10). In presenting this interpretation of Section 13, UDC misquotes 
Bourgeous by stating that he argued that the heading to Section 13 is 
inconsistent with the language in the body of Section 13. (UDC Brief, at pgs. 
14-15). This is not correct. Bourgeous has argued that the heading is both 
consistent with the body as well as gives clarification to Section 13. UDC 
concedes that the heading of Section 13 provides for reconsideration. Yet, UDC 
incorrectly reasons that the language in the body of Section 13 prohibits 
reconsideration. Accordingly, UDC implies that because the language within 
the statute is inconsistent with the headings, this Court must follow the language 
of the statute and not the heading. UDC is mistaken -- the heading and the 
language in the body of Section 13 are consistent with each other. To reach this 
incorrect conclusion, UDC argues: (a) that Agency Review is the exclusive 
remedy of a license denial; (2) that the prior statute would be redundant unless 
this Court uses UDC's interpretation of Section 13 of the current statute; (3) the 
cases cited by Bourgeous are not on point and therefore cannot be relied upon 
by this Court in interpreting the meaning of Sections 12 and 13; and (4) those 
situations where a state agency has provided for reconsideration of an Agency 
Review by regulation are exceptions to the statute and have no significance to 
UDC's position. 
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A. The Headings and Language of Sections 12 and 13 Establish That 
Reconsideration May Occur of an Agency Review. The heading which would 
be required to be consistent with UDC's interpretation of the body of Section 13 
would be something like "Reconsideration in Lieu of Agency Review1' or 
"Reconsideration Before Agency Review". This Court in Maverick Country 
Stores v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993), stated that 
under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") a Request for Review 
"asks a higher level decision maker to evaluate the claim." Whereas, "a Request 
for Reconsideration asks the highest level of administrative decision maker to 
reassess a claim they have previously examined." (Id. at 951). 
In this case, Bourgeous' original application for professional license was 
denied in a letter on September 24, 1997 by Karen McCall, secretary for the 
Bureau manager. Bourgeous does not disagree with UDC's argument that the 
only appeal from that letter was to seek Agency Review. The Agency Review 
was directed to Douglas C. Borda, the Executive Director of UDC. However, in 
his Order on Review dated October 24, 1997, Director Borda did not even get 
to the merits of the review. Rather, he dismissed the Request for Review on 
procedural basis claiming that Mr. Bourgeous had not provided a copy of the 
McCall denial letter. Director Borda was in fact the highest decision maker in 
the Agency process. Consequently, his decision could have been reconsidered 
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under Section 13 in accordance with the dicta of Maverick Country Stores. 
Under UDC's interpretation, Bourgeous could not seek reconsideration once he 
requested and received the highest official's (Director Borda) review of DOPL/s 
denial. This interpretation makes reconsideration an impossibility because 
Agency Review is always available under Section 12 of the UAPA. Section 13 
allows reconsideration only of the highest official's decision. It makes no sense 
for the Legislature to provide for reconsideration and then make the mechanism 
for seeking reconsideration an impossibility. Rather, the Legislature merely 
provided that an aggrieved party could go to Court after an Agency Review or 
could first seek reconsideration of such Agency Review. 
B. The Prior Statute Supports Bourgeous' Interpretation of Section 
13. UDC argues that the predecessor statute to Section 13 would be redundant 
if this Court were not to adopt UDC's interpretation that no reconsideration is 
allowed of an agency review. (Appellee's Brief, at p. 15). The prior statute 
stated: 
Within ten days after the date that an order on review is issued, or within 
ten days after the date that a final order is issued for which agency 
review is unavailable, any party may file a request for reconsideration... 
1987 Laws of Utah, Chapter 161, Section 269. (See, Addendum 10 to 
UDC's Brief). 
UDC argues that if "unavailable" means "utilized and exhausted", the first 
clause would be redundant of the second. UDC sets up this straw man 
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argument by assuming that "order on review" and "final order" must always be 
something different. However, an order on review under the UAPA was always 
a final order for purposes of seeking judicial review. Thus, under the old 
statute, an aggrieved party could seek reconsideration of any agency review, as 
well as reconsideration of a final agency order where no higher agency authority 
could be petitioned. There was no limitation. This has since changed. Under 
the new statute, reconsideration can only occur from the highest agency 
official's decision, which in this case was Director Borda's November 4, 1998 
order. Maverick Country Stores v. Industrial Commission. Therefore, Section 
13, as amended, permitted Bourgeous to seek reconsideration of Director 
Borda's Order. 
C. Case Law Supports the Right to Reconsideration of an Agency 
Review Under Section 13. UDC argues that this Court should ignore the 12 
cases cited by Bourgeous where Utah Courts have reviewed under a de novo 
standard, petitions from Agency denials of Requests for Reconsideration of an 
earlier final agency action or "Agency Review." The 12 cases are: Evans & 
Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comnu 327 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 
(Utah 1997); Harrington v. Industrial Comm.. 942 P.2d 961 (Utah App. 1997) 
Harper Investments v. Auditing Div.. 868 P.2d 813 (Utah 1994); Knowledge 
Data Systems v. Tax Commission, 865 P.2d 1387 (Utah App. 1993); 49th Street 
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Galleria v. Tax Com'n., 860 P.2d 996 (Utah App. 1993); Parkdale Care Center 
v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah App. 1992); Nelson v. Board of Equalization 
of Salt Lake County., 943 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1997); Newspaper Agency Corp. v. 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Com'n, 938 P.2d 266 (Utah 1997); Visitor 
Information Center Authority of Grand County v. Customer Service Div., Utah 
State Tax Com'n, 930 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1997); Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Tax 
Com'n of State of Utah ex rel MCI Telecommunications Corp., 895 P.2d 825 
(Utah 1995); and Lunnen v. Utah Dept. of Transp, 886 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 
1994); cf, Career Service Review Board v. Department of Corrections, 942 
P.2d 933, 945 (Utah 1997). 
UDC ignores the fact that all 12 cases involved state agencies which were 
governed by the UAPA. See, U.C.A. § 63-46b-2(l)(b) ("Agency1' broadly 
defined to include all agencies of the State). UDC is correct that none of the 12 
cases involved the specific issue of whether or not Section 13 permits 
reconsideration of an "Agency Review". Nonetheless, it is incomprehensible 
that such an important issue going to the very jurisdiction of the Court's review 
of these various agency actions would have been overlooked so many times. 
Even more compelling is the fact that many Utah State Agencies have enacted 
regulations themselves which provide for reconsideration of Agency Review. 
(See regulations quoted in Bourgeous' Opening Brief at pgs. 15 and 16). 
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UDC's opposition brief is conspicuously silent on this point. Nor can UDC 
offer any protection for the regulations of the previously listed agencies from 
being held inconsistent with the UAPA Administrative Procedures Act and 
therefore invalid if this Court accepts UDC's position that Section 13 of the Act 
prohibits reconsideration of Agency Review. 
D. The Regulations of the State Tax Commission are Consistent With 
Bourgeous' Interpretation of Section 13. UDC argues that the regulations of the 
Utah Tax Commission are an exception to the prohibition of Section 13 against 
reconsideration of an agency review. In a complete breakdown of logic, UDC 
argues that because the "Tax Commission has chosen to establish unique 
procedures through its rule making authority" which provides for "automatic 
review before orders are entered in elective agency reconsideration within 20 
days after an order is entered," that this Court should ignore the Tax 
Commission's procedures. (See, UDC Brief at pgs. 18-20). However, the Tax 
Commission, as is every other state agency, (including UDC and DOPL), is 
governed by and must insure that any regulation promulgated is consistent with 
the UAPA. U.C.A. § 63-46b-l and 22. 
Consequently, this Court should reverse the District Court's dismissal of 
Bourgeous' Complaint and remand this matter to UDC for reconsideration of the 
denial of Bourgeous' application for a professional engineering license. 
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II. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS LEGALLY AND 
FACTUALLY APPLICABLE TO UDC'S ACTIONS. 
In essence, UDC argues that equitable estoppel cannot apply to UDC's 
actions because Bourgeous "could not have relied to his detriment upon the 
Department's October 24, 1997 Order". However, that Order was defective. It 
did not meet all the requirements of the statute. (See, Bourgeous' Opening 
Brief, at pgs. 23-27). In an effort to cure this problem, UDC wishes to ignore 
the fact the Bourgeous did not receive 2 of the 4 pages to the October 24, 1997 
Order. (See, R86-87 and R144-145). The missing pages that Bourgeous should 
have received include the "notice" that he had 30 days to file suit. 
Furthermore, the detrimental reliance was not upon the October 24, 1997 
Order. Rather, it was on the November 4, 1997 Order wherein Bourgeous filed 
his Request for Reconsideration on November 20, 1997, by hand delivery to 
UDC. As was argued at pg. 26 of Bourgeous' Opening Brief, UDC failed to 
notify Bourgeous between November 20, 1997 and December 4, 1997 (the 
expiration of the 30 days in which to seek judicial relief), that he was not 
permitted to seek reconsideration. Had UDC so notified Bourgeous, the 30 days 
would not have expired. This is the basis of Bourgeous9 detrimental reliance. 
CONCLUSION 
In accordance with this Court's authority under U.C.A. § 78-21-3(2), 
Bourgeous requests that this Court remand this case to UDC for reconsideration 
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of Bourgeous9 license application in accordance with Section 13 of the Utah 
Administrative Procedure Act. In the alternative, Bourgeous requests that this 
Court reverse the District Court's dismissal of his Complaint and remand this 
case to the District Court for the Third District of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted this ' } day of January., 1999. 
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